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A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Coutts1 
(Disunionism) is a thought-provoking tour de force about many ills that 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Paul Carrington, Lauren 
Robel and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for 
processing this piece, as well as Ann and Tom Boone, and the Harris Trust for generous, 
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Diszmionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 929 (1996). 
49 
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federal court observers believe plague the modem federal district courts. 
In Disunionism, Professor Paul Carrington paints a perceptive portrait 
of the troubling conditions that he asserts impede civil litigation in a 
number of districts, and he trenchantly criticizes district judges for their 
contributions to these circumstances while admonishing the Judicial 
Conference to sweep "our national courts clear of all local clutter."2 
Disunionism is only the most recent of Professor Carrington's many 
attempts at cajoling those who could improve the districts or ameliorate 
the deterioration that has occurred. Indeed, Professor Carrington speaks 
with substantial expertise derived from a lifelong commitment to 
improving the federal courts.3 His four-decade career coincides with the 
period in which expanding caseloads have transformed the courts,4 and 
he has actively participated in numerous procedural reforms. For 
example, Professor Carrington, as the Reporter for the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee, ironically drafted a rule that he now criticizes as 
problematic.5 The above ideas mean that Professor Carrington's article 
warrants a response; this essay undertakes that effort. 
I first briefly describe Disunionism and then analyze its account of 
the districts. I find the current situation of the federal districts disturbing 
for numerous identical, and some different, reasons, but the dearth of 
empirical data complicates evaluation. Because Professor Carrington 
tersely treats many phenomena that seem to affect the courts, my essay 
elaborates his description by proffering related explanations for the 
condition of the districts. The response next assesses Disunionism's 
prescriptions for improving this situation. I ascertain that most, if 
properly implemented, appear responsive to certain difficulties confront-
ing the courts, but, the paucity of empirical material similarly frustrates 
analysis. The essay concludes with suggestions for securing better 
information on the districts and explores possibilities that have 
somewhat more realistic prospects for improving the most problematic 
circumstances. 
2. Id. at 1006. 
3. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); Paul D. 
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review 
and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); see also Carrington, supra note l, at 938 
n.55 (affording assimilation of some of Professor Carrington's work). 
4. See, e.g., William A. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the 
New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274-75 
(1996); infra note 63. 
5. See infra note 51 and accompanying text 
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I. DESCRIPTION OF DISUNION/SM 
In Disunionism, Professor Carrington initially discusses the advent 
and decline of national law's private enforcement.6 He explains how 
district judges enjoyed enormous discretionary power prior to passage 
of the Judiciary Act of 1875,7 which enhanced this power by creating 
"federal question jurisdiction, so that claims arising under the growing 
body of federal legislation could be brought before a federal" court.8 
The 1875 statute increased the already substantial mistrust of federal 
judges as "arrogant and unfeeling autocrats"9 and led Congress to pass 
the 1891 Evarts Act which established the United States Courts of 
Appeals to rein in the "kingly power" of the federal judiciary.10 In 
1934, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, which, like the 1875 
Judiciary Act, was intended to unify the judiciary for the purpose of 
enforcing rights which national law created partly through the adoption 
of uniform, simple procedures that would apply in all federal districts. 11 
By the 1960s, "federal courts had replaced administrative agencies as 
the preferred means of enforcing much of the national law."12 The 
district judges exercised increasing power and discretion, especially over 
the pretrial process, although appeals courts were able "to cabin that 
discretion" somewhat.13 
A "degeneration of federal civil practice"-a reduction in district 
judges' sense that enforcing legal rights and responsibilities is their 
principal business-has since occurred.14 Professor Carrington contends 
6. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 932-44. 
7. See id. at 932 (stating that various federal trial courts adopted local rules of procedure 
"with the blessing of Congress"); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences 
of Modem Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 640-41 (stating that trial judges created rules 
of procedure out of the common law pleadings system). 
8. Carrington, supra note l, at 933; see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat 470. 
9. Carrington, supra note 1, at 934. 
10. See id.; see also Act of Mar. 3,.1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See generally THOMAS 
E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 9-11 (1994). 
11. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 935; see also Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat 1064 
(1986); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025-
26 (1982) (discussing the history of the act). 
12. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 936. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1297 (1976) (stating that, in public law 
litigation, the process and outcome are more "legislative" than "adjudicative"); Carl Tobias, 
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 279-
96 (1989) (discussing the rise of public law litigation during the 1960s and 1970s). 
13. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 937-38. See generally Yeazell, supra note 7, at 632-39 
(discussing the replacement of the trial with pre-trial civil litigation). 
14. Carrington, supra note 1, at 938-39. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 
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that the "worth of all rights, claims and defenses enforceable" in courts 
diminishes with a decline in courts' "collective, institutional professional 
commitment to decide" cases by applying law to facts. 15 He asserts that 
these ephemeral, but ineffable, losses are costly in a society that depends 
on "law as the adhesive force binding a diverse population together."16 
Disunionism enumerates ten indicia of decreasing judicial professional-
ism. 17 They include the "growing preoccupation of district judges with 
administration"; managing pretrial litigation and encouraging settlement; 
the "proliferation of delegates performing judicial work in all" judges' 
chambers; and the increase in local procedures that reflect claims of 
local autonomy.18 
Professor Carrington asserts that these phenomena have transformed 
the office of District Judge since 1965.19 Judges' major mission has 
become manufacturing dispositions, rather than reaching decisions by 
applying law to the facts.20 Their primary work is conferring with 
attorneys and staff, not conducting trials.21 The judges have steadily 
acquired discretion and power at the expense of appellate judges.22 "In 
short, the district judge is each year less a judge of a law court and 
more a local chancellor or lord of the manor, more to be feared and less 
to be respected."23 Disunionism attributes this devolution mainly to 
growth in the courts' size "unaccompanied by modifications needed if 
the legislative purposes of 1891 and 1934 were to be preserved."24 
Professor Carrington then evaluates several ideas regarding procedur-
al localism.25 He states that the original 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were meant to promote national uniformity while according 
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 984, 987-91 (1987) (noting that the Federal Rules have been engulfed in 
a system of equity that calls for judicial management, and complicates rights enforcement). 
15. Carrington, supra note 1, at 939; see Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986) (stating that the pressure on courts to 
resolve conflicts has led to decline in adjudication). 
16. Carrington, supra note l, at 939-40. 
17. See id. at 940-42. 
18. Id. I emphasize local procedural proliferation because it is important to the districts' 
current condition and to the issues that I treat in this essay. 
19. Id. at 943. See generally William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future 
of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1 (discussing the changes in the federal courts since 
the late 1950s). 
20. Carrington, supra note 1, at 943. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 943-44; see Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to 
Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 52; supra text accompanying notes 10-11. 
25. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 944-52. 
1997) FEDERAL PROCEDURAL REFORM 53 
district judges considerable discretion.26 Disunionism also explains how 
the drafters of Rule 83 authorized districts to adopt local rules that were 
consistent with the Federal Rules but contemplated that courts would 
implement local procedures sparingly.27 Professor Carrington finds that 
the abundant local procedural variation that actually did occur derives 
more from differences in the values and styles of specific groups of 
judges than from local conditions.28 
Professor Carrington contends that local strictures treating matters 
covered by the Federal Rules tend to create legal clutter-"background 
noise" that makes it more difficult to hear significant mandates in rules 
which will be enforced by appeals courts.29 Legal clutter erodes 
simplicity, complicates comprehension of the real rules, and fosters 
satellite litigation. 30 It also favors the cognoscenti, particularly local 
lawyers, and expert litigators, while it disadvantages those who appear 
less frequently in federal court and increases the cost of legal servic-
es. 31 
The proliferation of local procedures became problematic soon after 
the adoption of the 1938 Rules and gradually worsened thereafter.32 By 
the mid-1980s, local requirements substantially impeded legal practice, 
fostered expense and delay, and were a pitfall for the unwary.33 The 
local procedures often repeated or conflicted with national rules and 
were difficult to find and understand.34 The Judicial Conference and 
Congress respectively addressed complaints about the number of local 
requirements and attempted to reduce expanding localism by amending 
Rule 83 and revising the Rules Enabling Act with the 1988 Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act (JIAJA).35 
26. Id. at 944-45. See generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial 
Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1591-92 (1994). 
27. See Carrington, supra note l, at 944. See generally Carl Tobias, More Modem Civil 
Process, 56 U. Pm. L. REV. 801 (1995) (discussing the unintended overuse of Rule 83). 
28. Carrington, supra note l, at 946. 
29. Id. at 947. 
30. See id. at 947-48. 
31. See id. 
32. See generally id. at 948-51 (discussing scope of the effects of the 1938 Rules). 
33. Id. at 951. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of 
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1397-98 (1992) (citing Local Rules Project 
finding that the 94 district courts had promulgated over 5000 local rules). 
34. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 951. 
35. Id. at 951-52; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 83, reprinted in 105 RR.D. 225 (1985); 28 
U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071 (1994). The Conference also commissioned the Local Rules Project 
to analyze local procedural proliferation. See Tobias, supra note 33, at 1398 & n.34 (citing 
COMMmEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE LocAL RULES PROJECT: LocAL RULES ON CML PRACTICE (1989) [hereinafter 
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Professor Carrington next examines the Civil Justice Reform Act 
(CJRA) of 1990.36 In spite of minimal empirical data, he states that the 
statute responded to growing concerns about cost and delay in civil 
lawsuits and to excessive reliance on litigation to solve problems, 
although minimal empirical data supported the existence of these 
phenomena. 37 Disunionism shows that Congress failed to reconcile the 
inconsistent purposes of the 1988 and 1990 legislation.38 The article 
asserts that Advisory Groups appointed under the CJRA to recommend 
local experimental strictures risked being co-opted by the judges who 
appointed them or drafted procedures that would benefit the group 
members' clients and disadvantage their adversaries, especially lawyers 
and litigants located outside the districts.39 
Disunionism then evaluates six important questions raised by the 
CJRA expense and delay reduction plan promulgated by the Eastern 
District of Texas. 40 Professor Carrington claims that a negative answer 
to any of these questions would invalidate the Texas plan.41 These 
issues, which implicate the court's authority to adopt and apply the 
plan's provisions, warrant relatively little treatment here because they 
are less important to the ideas that I examine in this essay. 
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT 
A. Areas of Agreement 
Much consensus attends Professor Carrington's descriptive account 
of the condition of the districts.42 The broad contours of his description 
of what has happened in the districts since 1965 are not disputed. For 
example, many observers agree that judges have accumulated greater 
power and discretion,43 employed proliferating local procedures which 
LOCAL RULES PROJECT]). 
36. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 952-66; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994). 
37. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 953, 956. 
38. See id. at 963. 
39. See id. at 964. 
40. See id. at 965-1005. 
41. See id. at 965-66. Professor Carrington contends, "albeit with uneven confidence, that 
the correct answers to all six are negative." Id. at 966. 
42. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 26; Tobias, supra note 27; Tobias, supra note 33. I agree 
with much that Disunionism describes, and I rely on my service as a member of the Ninth 
Circuit Local Rules Review Committee and of the CJRA Advisory Group for the Montana 
District; review of local rules, individual judge procedures, and the CJRA's implementation and 
anecdotal information derived from many discussions with federal court judges, lawyers, 
litigants, and staff. 
43. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
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accentuate these two phenomena,44 evinced declining interest in 
resolving disputes by hearing factual presentations and applying the law 
to facts, and concomitantly been more concerned about securing 
dispositions primarily through case management and settlement.45 There 
is also great agreement about numerous additional phenomena that are 
important to the districts, such as civil procedure's increasingly 
balkanized condition and the beleaguered state of the national civil rule 
revision process.46 
B. Areas of Disagreement or Uncertainty 
. Less consensus, uncertainty, and even controversy, accompany some 
aspects of Disunionism's descriptive account, partly because there is 
insufficient reliable empirical data on which to premise definitive 
conclusions. One helpful illustration is the extent to which accurate 
conclusions about other districts and judges can be derived from the 
troubling experience in Eastern Texas which Professor Carrington so 
meticulously examines.47 
I believe that caution is warranted in extrapolating a general rule 
from the actions of a single district or a lone judge. The Eastern District 
of Texas may be sui generis or, at least, very unusual. For instance, 
many judges opposed the CJRA, considering the statute an unwarranted 
congressional intrusion into a coordinate branch's core function, 
procedural rulemaking.48 Judge Robert Parker, the Eastern District's 
Chief Judge and Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management when the court promulgated its 
CJRA plan and the Committee approved it, was apparently a vociferous 
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989); Yeazell, supra note 7, at 647. 
44. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Unifonnity, 
Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2011-16 (1989); 
Tobias, supra note 27, at 810. 
45. See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in 
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 770-73 (1981); Judith Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982); Resnik, supra note 15, at 529-39. 
46. See, e.g., Symposium, Reinventing Civil Litigation: Evaluating Proposals for Change, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 655 (1993); Symposium, Turbulence in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: The 1993 Amendments and.Beyond, 14 REV. LmG. 1 (1994); see also BAKER, supra 
note 10 (documenting erosion of federal appellate justice). 
47. Carrington, supra note 1, at 929-32. 
48. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Refonnation in Procedural Justice, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 375, 399-401 (1992); Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice 
Refonn Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (1994). But see Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 
Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1288-90 (1994) 
(asserting that Congress has not relinquished rulemaking authority). 
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critic of the CJRA and may have orchestrated adoption of the plan's 
controversial provisions as a way of protesting the CJRA's passage.49 
A survey of procedures in the other ninety-three districts shows that 
few courts prescribed requirements that conflicted with the Federal 
Rules or Acts of Congress, while no districts declared that local 
provisions took precedence over the Federal Rules. Some courts that 
adopted inconsistent strictures never applied them.50 A critical reason 
why so few districts promulgated unauthorized conflicting procedures 
was the 1993 revision of Rule 26 which specifically approved local 
variations of automatic disclosure procedures, the area in which most 
courts had initially prescribed inconsistent requirements.51 Thus, the 
actions of the Eastern District of Texas, in applying and sustaining the 
validity of conflicting local strictures, were the worst case scenario. This 
seemingly anomalous action of a single district illustrates that the risk 
in concluding too readily that one renegade district or judge constitutes 
a rebellion. The CJRA's language and purposes actually suggest that it 
was a modest reform,52 and most districts and judges modestly imple-
mented the Act.53 
In short, Professor Carrington deserves praise for incisively analyzing 
the pernicious example of declining professionalism found in the Eastern 
District of Texas, and which may be symptomatic of numerous trial 
courts. However, I want to scrutinize some phenomena that affect the 
districts, most of which Professor Carrington briefly evaluates, but 
which I believe deserve closer study because of their importance to 
49. See Tobias, supra note 33, at 1409-10. These ideas are based on conversations with 
several individuals who are familiar with what happened. The Committee had responsibility for 
monitoring local procedures adopted under the CJRA. See 28 U.S.C. § 474(b) (1994). 
50. Montana prescribed, but never created, a peer review committee to advise the court 
on discovery disputes. The district has retained an opt-out provision invalidated by the Ninth 
Circuit, for securing consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. See infra note 138; see also 
Carrington, supra note 1, at 979; Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 
MONT. L. REV. 91, 95-96 (1992). 
51. See Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real 
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 304-06 (1994) (noting that a proposed draft governing mandatory 
disclosure influenced action of more than 20 districts before the rule was adopted); Tobias, supra 
note 26, at 1614; infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. 
52. See Biden, supra note 48, at 1287; see also Interview with Mark H. Gitenstein, Mayer, 
Brown, & Platt, Washington, D.C., and former staff director, Foundation for Change (Oct. 18, 
1996). 
53. Some courts discovered or experimented with efficacious procedures. Maine resolved 
discovery disputes with telephone conferences which reduced written procedures' expense and 
delay. See Interview with D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge for the District of Maine (Oct. 
11, 1996). Western Missouri realized savings with an Early Assessment Program. See Carl 
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Western District of Missouri, 58 Mo. L. REV. 335, 337-38 
(1993) (analyzing the Western District of Missouri program). 
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understanding the devolution witnessed and other difficulties facing the 
courts. 
C. Elaborating Disunionism' s Description: 
Disarray in the Federal Districts 
Certain ideas examined above suggest, and numerous federal courts 
observers believe, that the districts are now experiencing serious 
problems, while many scholars have commented on devolution.s4 
Professor Linda Mullenix and I independently have found that lawyers 
and parties who pursue civil litigation confront an overwhelming number 
of complex procedures that are difficult to satisfy.ss Professor Charles 
Alan Wright has remarked that national rulemaking is characterized by 
malaise and analogized this situation to Europe immediately before the 
outbreak of World War I.s6 
1. Expanding Federal Court Jurisdiction 
and Caseloads 
Important reasons for the condition of the districts have been docket 
growth, which resulted principally from congressional willingness to 
expand federal civil and criminal jurisdiction, and the attendant 
reluctance of Congress to appropriate resources that would allow courts 
to treat properly the multiplying suits that arose.s7 The original 1938 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and most subsequent revisions, which 
embodied a liberal regime that judges flexibly and pragmatically 
applied,ss facilitated litigation by increasing plaintiffs' ability to initiate 
cases, complete full discovery, and reach the merits.s9 Courts' broad 
54. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 48; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak 
to the Future: Subrin's New·Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy 
Problem," 46 FLA. L. REV. 57 (1994). 
55. See Mullenix, supra note 48, at 380-81; Tobias, supra note 33, at 1422-27 (discussing 
the balkanization created by the proliferation of local procedures). 
56. See Charles Alan Wright, The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 11 
(1994) (Foreword to Symposium). 
57. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat 1796; Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat 
327; see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1255, 1270 (1996) (analyzing sources of appellate court docket growth). 
But see Linda Greenhouse, How Congress Curtailed the Courts' Jurisdiction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 
27, 1996, at ES (describing briefly congressional action that limited access to federal courts). 
58. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 12, at 271-96; Yeazell, supra note 7, at 646-66 
(explaining the evolution of civil procedure over the last century); see also Tobias, supra note 
26, at 1592-98 (finding that 1983 and 1993 revisions partially altered the liberal regime). 
59. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules 
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interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in such areas as 
civil and prisoner rights correspondingly encouraged filings.60 
Numerous judges addressed these growing dockets with local 
procedures, which primarily governed the pretrial process, and which 
occasionally contravened the Federal Rules.61 Districts and judges 
invoked the need to resolve more cases, justifying actions similar to 
those of the Eastern District of Texas. 62 Courts thus practiced manage-
rial judging pursuant to new or amended local strictures-changes that 
were effectively codified by the 1983 federal rules revisions and the 
1990 CJRA.63 
2. Local Procedural Proliferation 
Local procedures, particularly those that were inconsistent with 
Federal Rules requirements, have proliferated since 1970.64 Attorneys 
and litigants not only must locate, comprehend, and comply with 
expanding numbers of local requirements, but they must also research 
and draft additional papers, including discovery plans, and participate in 
more activities, such as status and settlement conferences.65 These 
developments apparently have increased cost and delay in federal civil 
litigation. 66 Indeed, procedures promulgated by an individual judge, to 
which Dis unionism only alludes, 67 have greater potential for abuse than 
of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439-40 (1986); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2202-07 (1989) 
(stating that a decision on the merits was an early goal of the rules and holds true today). 
60. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. 
REV. l, 5-7 (1984); Resnik, supra note 15, at 516-17 (stating that courts have, in some ways, 
tried to provide counsel to the impoverished, based on the premise that courts have a firm 
commitment to adjudication). 
61. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 647, 675-78 (1988) (discussing the extent of judicial pretrial involvement). 
62. See supra notes 36, 45; infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text 
63. Appellate docket pressures and responses thereto may be more troubling than those 
of the districts. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 1 O; Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for 
a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25 (stating that from 1960 
to 1994, appeals court filings increased by 1139% while district courts only increased 216%). 
64. See Subrin, supra note 44, at 2011-16; Tobias, supra note 33, at 1397-99; see also 
supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text. I emphasize local strictures, but national requirements 
also have proliferated. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
65. See Subrin, supra note 44, at 2018-26. 
66. See Tobias, supra note 33, at 1398-99. 
67. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 948; see also Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. 
Korn, Individual Judges' Practices: An Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 1-7 (1994) (discussing individual judge procedures); 
Tobias, supra note 26, at 1596-97 (same); see also DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL COURT GUIDELINES 
(1996) (compiling procedures of individual judges). Individual judge procedures are similar to 
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the activities of the Eastern District of Texas. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that many newly-appointed judges prescribe the strictures and 
that numerous sitting judges apply them.68 The procedures receive 
limited public scrutiny, while lawyers and parties, especially those who 
do not regularly participate in litigation in particular districts or before 
specific judges, may have little familiarity with them. Most attorneys 
and clients, particularly those who frequently appear before the same 
judge, are reluctant to challenge the measures because they wish to 
preserve harmonious, ongoing relations with the judge.69 Moreover, 
judges zealously guard their prerogatives to apply the strictures and are 
unlikely to relinquish them. 
Local procedures, especially ones that conflict with Federal Rules or 
statutes, have increased, despite concerted efforts to limit their prolifera-
tion. Most importantly, Congress passed the 1988 JIAJA and the Judicial 
Conference orchestrated the 1985 revision of Rule 83. The 1988 Act 
requires circuit judicial councils to review local procedures periodically 
and to abolish or modify those procedures that contravene the Federal 
Rules or statutes.70 The JIAJA and Rule 83 correspondingly prohibit 
districts and judges from promulgating inconsistent local strictures.71 
The 1988 JIAJA and the 1985 revision to Rule 83 also recommend that 
districts propose procedural changes and afford public notice and 
comment before they adopt new, or alter existing, local rules.72 The 
1985 revision mandates that standing orders not conflict with the Federal 
Rules or the district's local rules, and the advisory committee note 
requests that districts institute processes for prescribing and reviewing 
the orders.73 
standing orders. 
68. These assertions are premised on conversations with numerous individuals who are 
familiar with the procedures. See generally DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL COURr GUIDELINES (1996). 
69. See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 
U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1576 (1991); see also Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (finding that the 
ambiguous facets of litigation have established a dual system that distinguishes between society's 
"have" and "have not" and discussing the idea of repeat players); infra note 138 and 
accompanying text. 
70. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071 (1994). 
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 83, reprinted in 105 F.R.D. 225 (1985). 
72. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077(b) (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 83, reprinted in 105 F.R.D. 
225 (1985). Many districts created CJRA advisory groups whose membership resembled that of 
advisory committees. See 28 U.S.C. § 478 (1994); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court 
Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 (1995). The 1988 IlAJA requires 
that districts create advisory committees and may require that specific judges use them. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2077(b) (1994); id. at § 2071 note; Tobias, supra note 26, at 1600 & n.66. 
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83, reprinted in 105 F.R.D. 225 (1985); FED. R. CIV. P. 83 
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In 1989, the Local Rules Project issued a comprehensive report that 
found more than 5000 local requirements, many of which conflicted 
with Federal Rules, in the ninety-four districts.74 The Project proposed 
that inconsistent procedures be abrogated or changed.75 The Judicial 
Conference asked courts and judges to follow this suggestion and to 
number local rules uniformly.76 
Numerous districts and judges did not comply with these requests, 
and the 1995 revision of Rule 83 was designed to address those 
problems. The revision requires that local rules "conform to any uniform 
numbering system prescribed by" the Conference77 and not conflict 
with, or duplicate, the Federal Rules or statutes.78 The revision further 
mandates that judges not enforce local rules of form by forfeiting 
litigants' rights79 and that courts not disadvantage parties for noncom-
pliance with local procedures of which parties have no actual notice. 80 
There are several explanations for the local proliferation since 197 5. 
First, the 1990 passage of the CJRA frustrated effectuation of congres-
sional and Conference initiatives that were meant to limit local 
strictures' expansion. The CJRA empowered districts and judges to 
experiment with local expense and delay reduction procedures, 
apparently ones that even contravened the Federal Rules and statutes.81 
Some circuit councils, districts and judges could have justifiably 
believed that this authorization postponed the congressional and 
Conference efforts until the CJRA's 1997 conclusion.82 For example, 
the councils might have been reluctant to implement the 1988 IlAJA's 
command to review and abrogate or change conflicting local strictures 
after the strictures were seemingly approved by the 1990 CJRA.83 
Because councils have scant resources and Congress appropriated no 
advisory comm. note, reprinted in 105 F.R.D. at 228. The 1988 legislation can be read to 
impose similar mandates. 
74. Tobias, supra note 33, at 1398 (citing LocAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 35). 
75. See id. at 1398-99 (citing LoCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 35); see also Subrin, 
supra note 44, at 2020-26 (discussing the results of the Local Rules Project). 
76. Tobias, supra note 26, at 1597. 
77. See FED. R. CJV. P. 83, reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 400, 401 (1993). 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 83, reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 401 (1993). 
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 83, reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 401-02 (1993). 
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 83, reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 402 (1993). 
81. See Mullenix, supra note 48, at 379 (stating that "Congress has effectively repealed 
the Rules Enabling Act" by authorizing districts to adopt inconsistent local procedures); Robel, 
supra note 48, at 1482-83 (commenting on Professor Mullenix's assessment). 
82. See Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, supra note 72, 
at 367. 
83. See Carl Tobias, A Sixth Circuit Story, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 983, 987-88 (1996). 
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funds for procedural review, 84 the councils could have considered this 
scrutiny unnecessary or wasteful until the 1997 expiration of the CJRA. 
Additional reasons may explain reluctance to effectuate legislative 
and Conference efforts aimed at reducing local proliferation. Numerous 
federal judges who have oversight duties probably believe that the 
judges of particular districts have superior knowledge regarding local 
civil litigation.85 Those judges who monitor may defer to local judges' 
decisions in adopting and applying measures that they think will most 
effectively resolve civil lawsuits.86 Even district judges might be 
unwilling to review rigourously, much less abrogate or modify, local 
strictures that have been or may be adopted within their own districts or 
by judges with whom they could have ongoing, close relationships or 
with whose districts they are rather unfamiliar.87 Recent experience 
with implementation of monitoring responsibilities assigned under the 
1990 CJRA confirms these ideas.88 Finally, the absence of a meaning-
ful congressional mechanism for reviewing local procedures, which 
sharply contrasts with Congress' effective veto power over national 
revisions with which it disagrees,89 accentuates proliferation's impor-
tance. 
3. National Rule Revision 
The federal amendment process and the national rule revision enti-
ties-the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, the Judicial 
Conference, and Congress-could also be r~sponsible for the current 
condition of the districts.90 By the 1980s, the revisers may have 
become too solicitous of the bench's views and insufficiently concerned 
84. See id. at 987. 
85. See Tobias, supra note 33, at 1406-09. 
86. Circuit judges, many of whom know relatively little about district judges' daily 
activities or trial court civil litigation, are especially likely to defer. See Tobias, supra note 33, 
at 1406-07. 
87. See id. at 1407. 
88. See id. at 1408 (stating that most circuit review committees undertook circumscribed 
scrutiny of the CJRA procedures prescribed by districts and judges situated in the circuits). The 
Judicial Conference correspondingly discharged its oversight obligations with little rigor. See id. 
at 1409. Few of the 94 districts changed any CJRA strictures in response to circuit or 
Conference review. See id. at 1411; see also 28 U.S.C. § 474 (1994) (describing requirements 
for review of district court procedures). 
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a)(l 994) (outlining rule proposal procedures); Tobias, supra note 
26, at 1627 (noting the lack of congressional oversight of local rulemaking). 
90. See John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on Reforming the Process of Revising the Federal 
Rules, 55 MONT. L. REV. 435, 439-40 (1994); Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated, 
46 FLA. L. REV. 127, 130-38 (1994) (analyzing the rule revision process established in 1988); 
see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2074 (1994). 
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about the needs of federal court practitioners and litigants and the 
broader public interest. These attributes were evidenced most clearly in 
the 1983 amendments to Federal Rules 11, 16, and 26-which effective-
ly codified the managerial judging that many districts and judges already 
had been practicing91-because the revisions were seemingly adopted 
of, by, and for the federal judiciary.92 The requirements of opening, and 
enhancing public participation in, national civil rule amendment imposed 
by Congress in the 1988 JIAJA, thus, were partly intended as corrective 
mechanisms. 
The first major test of the modifications to the national revision 
process yielded the 1993 federal rules amendments.93 Most relevant 
were two changes in Rule 26.94 These changes prescribed automatic 
disclosure-a highly controversial technique requiring the release of 
important information before formal discovery-and authorized all 
ninety-four districts not to apply federal strictures covering disclosure, 
interrogatories, and depositions, or to experiment with variations of these 
discovery mechanisms that the districts deemed best.95 
The automatic disclosure issue provoked the greatest controversy, 
and the most vociferous lobbying effort, in the history of the national 
revision process.96 During one six-week period, the Advisory Commit-
tee withdrew the amendment and formulated a new provision absent 
public input.97 The Supreme Court transmitted the revision to Congress 
over the dissent of three Justices, while expressly disavowing substan-
tive responsibility for the amendment tendered.98 People and groups 
that represented a broad spectrum of special interests then intensively 
lobbied Congress, nearly preventing the revision from taking effect.99 
91. See supra note 46; supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
92. See Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil 
Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 936-37 (1991) (discussing the effect of the rule revisions which 
enhanced judicial discretion on judicial management); see also Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era 
in American Civil Procedure, 61 A.B.A. J. 1648 (1981) (examining the 1981 proposed rule 
amendments). See generally AIITHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND 
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Tobias, supra note 26, at 1594-95 (noting the trend toward 
managerial judging). 
93. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993). 
94. See id. at 431-32. 
95. In fairness, the local option provision accommodated ongoing CJRA experimentation. 
See Carrington, supra note 51, at 306; infra text accompanying note 141. 
96. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 1611-15 (describing the amendment of Rule 26). 
97. See id. at 1612. 
98. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507 (1993). 
99. See William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 1-4 (1993) (describing the flood 
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Congress failed to act at the last-minute and exacerbated confusion in 
some districts that were unprepared for this contingency, while many 
districts rejected the federal amendment or adopted different disclosure 
rules. 100 These developments and provision for variations in strictures 
governing interrogatories and depositions fragmented nationally and 
within specific districts important aspects of disccovery.101 
Additional legislative action relating to the national civil rule revision 
process has significantly affected the revision. Since the early 1970s, 
Congress has been increasingly willing to intervene in the process for 
amending the rules that govern evidence, as well as appellate, criminal, 
and civil procedure.102 Congress also has included more stric-
tures-covering, for example, pleading, intervention and attorney's 
fees-in substantive statutes, such as environmental and civil rights 
legislation. 103 The Republican Party's Contract With America constitut-
ed the most recent manifestation of this phenomenon. For instance, the 
eighth tenet promised to change Rule 11 two years after its major 1993 
overhaul,104 while the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
modified requirements relating to pleading, class actions and sanctions 
in securities suits.105 
The ideas above mean that the most vexing questions regarding 
national civil rule revision today are whether the amendment procedures 
which have served so well for six decades can be revitalized and the 
revisors reattain primary responsibility for federal rule amendment that 
they formerly had. 106 Experience with the 1993 revisions suggests that 
the 1988 JIAJA politicized the revision process and opened it to public 
participation.107 The 1988 statute similarly opened and politicized local 
of public comment on the proposed rule and its impact on the rule's modification and revision). 
100. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 1614. 
101. See id. at 1614-15. 
102. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1019-20; Tobias, supra note 92, at 961. 
103. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see also Oakley, supra note 90, at 436; Tobias, supra note 12, at 284-
85. 
I 04. See Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, I 04th Cong., I st Sess., § 4 
(1995); see also Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171 (1994). 
See generally Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 
(1995) (analyzing the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act). 
105. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). See generally Symposium on the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 975 (1996) (presenting commentary on 
the Act). 
I 06. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and 
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 810-54 (1991) (discussing the politicization 
of the rulemaking process); Tobias, supra note 26, at 1627-34. 
I 07. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 1606-17 (examining the rule amendment process of the 
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procedural amendment processes, phenomena to which CJRA implemen-
tation attests.108 The 1990 effectuation of the CJRA and the 1993 
federal revision process additionally undermined the authority of, and 
confidence in, national amendment partly because the revisors, by 
authorizing local variation, appeared to abandon a longstanding 
commitment to preserving a national, uniform code of procedure. 109 
4. Interbranch Conflicts 
Decreasing cooperation, and even deteriorating relationships, among 
members of Congress and the judiciary have seemingly contributed to 
the disarray in the federal districts. Reduced cooperation and growing 
conflicts can be witnessed across numerous areas that implicate the 
legislative and judicial branches. 110 These developments may have 
exceeded the healthy tension between Congress and the federal courts 
that the Framers of the Constitution apparently envisioned would prevent 
a single branch from accumulating too much power. 
Recent disputes over rule revision resulted partly from the increasing 
propensity of Congress to intervene in the processes for amending all of 
the federal rules governing procedure and evidence and to include 
procedural provisions in substantive statutes.111 The disputes also arose 
from the national civil rule revisors' inattention to interests other than 
those of the judiciary. This situation prompted the 1988 passage of the 
IlAJA, thereby opening and politicizing the federal amendment process 
and leading to the difficulties examined above. 112 Indeed, the 1990 
CJRA, which numerous judges viewed as interfering with their 
fundamental duty to adopt procedures that would best resolve civil 
litigation, effectively represented the culmination of congressional 
intervention in national revision. 113 
There have been many instances of interbranch conflict in areas that 
are distinct from rule amendment. One critical point of contention 
1993 revisions); see also supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. 
108. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 1617-23. 
109. See Oakley, supra note 90! at 437-38. See generally Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 REV. LITIG. 49 
(1994) (promoting uniformity within the procedural system); supra notes 95-100 and 
accompanying text. 
110. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 
reprinted in 18 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 499, 499-503 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist's year end 
reports and issues of The Third Branch, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts monthly 
publication, are replete with examples of tensions. See also infra notes 114-16, 118. 
111. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 90-92, 106-09 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
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involves the federal courts' budget. Judges believe that Congress wants 
them to achieve more with fewer dollars, and members of Congress 
think that judges are making extravagant demands. 114 A second 
example is Senator Charles Grassley's (R-Iowa) request for information 
on how judges spend their time. 115 Judges, many of whom are over-
worked, may wonder about Congress's need for this material and its 
temporal expenditures. Another conflict involves attacks, apparently 
motivated by partisan politics, on individual judges for issuing specific 
decisions. This dynamic has so troubled the American Bar Association 
that the organization created a commission to analyze the issue of 
judicial independence. 116 
The judiciary, for its part, recently adopted a Long Range Plan 
recommending that. Congress restrict federal jurisdiction, an action 
which many members of Congress believe to be an essential legislative 
function, and asserting positions on other issues that primarily involved 
congressional policymaking.117 The federal courts have also planned 
courthouse construction projects and staged circuit conferences that seem 
lavish, even for judicial officers. 118 
In sum, the lack of empirical data about the issues discussed 
complicates efforts to secure a sufficiently clear understanding of the 
federal districts on which to premise critical analyses of Disunionism's 
description and prescriptions. However, Professor Carrington's sugges-
tions can be assessed by identifying with enough certainty some 
phenomena that are adversely affecting the courts to which he recom-
mends solutions and by assuming that his description is accurate as to 
others. 
114. See William H. Rehnquist, I995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, reprinted 
in 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 491, 492-93 (1996); see a/so Judiciary Secures FY96 Funding, THE 
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1996, at I. 
115. See Kirk Victor, Judgment Day, NAT'L J., May 25, 1996, at 1140; Conference Will 
Submit Institutional Response to Grassley Survey, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1996, at 12. 
116. See John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50, 51; American Bar 
Association Examines Judicial Independence, THE THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1996, at 2. 
117. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 21-39, 134-35 (1995) [hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN]; Lauren Robel, 
Impenneable Federalism, Pragmatic Silence and the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 
71 IND. L.J. 841, 846-49 (1996). 
118. See Victor, supra note 115, at 1144; Cowen Considers Courthouse Construction and 
Security, THE THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1996, at 10. The recent Ninth Circuit conclave in Hawaii 
is illustrative. The major reasons seem to be the four discussed previously, but there are others, 
such as changes in legal practice, some of which Disunionism mentions. See Carrington, supra 
note 1, at 938-44. 
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III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PRESCRIPTIONS 
A. Areas of Agreement 
[Vol.49 
There is much consensus about most of Disunionism's proposals. For 
example, a few observers essentially agree with its recommendation that 
the Judicial Conference "sweep our national courts clear of all local 
clutter" once the CJRA has expired. 119 Some commentators concur 
"that the Civil Rules, at least, should be revised to eliminate all 
authorizations for variations from or elaborations or enhancements of the 
national rules, especially those promulgated in 1993 to accommodate 
CJRA."120 Professor Carrington's suggestion that a local rule become 
effective only after adoption by the circuit council "upon a finding that 
it is recommended by the district judges and is responsive to a specified 
local need or serves a national need for controlled experimentation to be 
conducted under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center"121 resem-
bles a 1991 proposed revision of Rule 83 which the Conference 
withdrew ostensibly in deference to ongoing CJRA experimentation. 122 
A few writers espoused this idea before the Conference supported it, and 
some advocated the idea's revival after the proposal was retracted.123 
Disunionism suggests that district judges be allowed to issue standing 
orders but that the orders not "exceed a length stipulated in the rules" 
and not be enforceable by sanctions which prejudice parties' substantive 
rights, and those ideas correspondingly embody124 certain aspects of 
119. See, e.g., Bromberg & Korn, supra note 67, at 20; Wright, supra note 56, at 10-11; 
see also Robel, supra note 109, at 58-59 (noting that the proliferation of local rules fosters 
confusion). 
120. Carrington, supra note 1, at 1006; see, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice 
Refonn Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can 
Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts Be Remedied by Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
721, 754-55 (1993); Tobias, supra note 26, at 1632-34. 
121. Carrington, supra note 1, at 1006. 
122. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., 
Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991). 
123. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 69, at 1576-77; Laurens Walker, Peifecting Federal Civil 
Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, 
at 67; see also Tobias, supra note 26, at 1632-34 (proposing revival). See generally Robert B. 
Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension With Unifonnity, 50 U. PITI'. L. REV. 853, 
868 (1989) (supporting local rules but suggesting that a judge inform the bar of personal 
procedural rules). 
124. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text; FED. R. CIV. P. 83, reprinted in 150 
F.R.D. 400, 401 (1993); see also Levin, supra note 69; Robel, supra note 109. See generally 
Carrington, supra note 1, at 1006. 
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that 1991 proposal and of Rule 83's 1995 amendment.125 Finally, 
because "[u]nrestrained localism in the federal courts is mischief serving 
no purpose that Congress can honorably embrace,"126 others have 
echoed Professor Carrington's plea that Congress favorably view these 
strictures on local rules and impose them if the Conference does not. 
B. Areas of Disagreement or Uncertainty 
Less consensus and considerable uncertainty attend certain features 
of Professor Carrington's prescriptions. My concerns focus primarily on 
the institutions and people who would implement the proposals and 
whether such proposals have a realistic prospect of being implemented. 
Illustrative is the Judicial Conference's unwillingness to restrict 
inconsistent local requirements, much less remove the local clutter from 
the federal courts, particularly if numerous districts or judges wish to 
maintain them.127 Since 1975, local procedures, many of which conflict 
with the Federal Rules, have steadily proliferated, despite substantial 
efforts to limit their expansion. 128 This exponential increase testifies to 
the durability of those local requirements and to judges' perception of 
the strictures' desirability. Even if the Conference fervently wanted to 
eliminate all local clutter, it might not be able to effect the prohibition 
or to secure the necessary cooperation from districts and judges. For 
instance, the Conference has realized little success in implementing the 
recommendations of the Local Rules Project, the 1985 revision of Rule 
83, and the mandates of the 1988 IlAJA, which were all intended to 
reduce local proliferation. 129 
If the Conference were unwilling to act, or unable to achieve success, 
Congress might not assume the initiative. The members of Congress 
seem to lack sufficient interest in the minutiae of court administration 
and may not commit the requisite resources to developing the necessary 
expertise. Indeed, the 104th Congress failed to authorize a national 
appeals courts study, although numerous members of the body and 
experts believe that the situation of the circuits is now more critical than 
that of the districts.130 Even if Congress would focus attention on, and 
125. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 1006. 
126. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 1006. 
127. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 54-118 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text. Nothing that I have said disparages the 
gargantuan efforts to rectify proliferation of certain individuals, such as Dan Coquillette, the 
Reporter for the Standing Committee and the Project. 
130. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also BAKER, supra note 10; Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. Rep. No. 104-197, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1995); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1358 
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devote resources to, the courts, it might not eliminate or restrict local 
strictures, such as standing orders, about which many district judges feel 
strongly. In short, I am considerably less sanguine than Professor 
Carrington that the Conference or Congress will effectively implement 
his valuable recommendations. 
My concerns partly implicate the efficacy of some of Professor 
Carrington's prescriptions. For example, if districts or judges find CJRA 
procedures to be effective, they will maintain the strictures absent strong 
external pressure, which may not be applied. A decade of experience 
with Rule 83's commands governing standing orders-mandates that 
many judges have honored in the breach-inspires little confidence in 
the feasibility of Professor Carrington's suggestions regarding those 
orders. 131 Moreover, his proposal that they "not be enforceable by any 
sanction prejudicing the substantive rights of litigants"132 is in Rule 
83's 1995 revision,133 but it may not protect lawyers and parties who 
wish to preserve cordial, continuing relationships with specific districts 
and judges and, thus, may be unwilling to challenge enforcement. 
In sum, most of Professor Carrington's prescriptions would apparent-
ly be efficacious. However, the paucity of reliable empirical information 
complicates the assessment of certain of these suggestions and of others 
about which there is less consensus. Accordingly, the last section of this 
essay affords recommendations for the future that primarily call for the 
collection of additional, and more dependable, information, and the 
improvement of current conditions. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE 
A. Collecting Additional Information 
The dearth of reliable data on the districts and judges means that 
assessors should systematically compile, analyze, and synthesize better 
empirical information. There is a need to identify the phenomena that 
are responsible for the described devolution; the most problematic 
difficulties that districts, judges, lawyers, and parties now encounter and 
will experience in the future; whether anything found is sufficiently 
troubling to warrant treatment; and, if treatment is warranted, responses 
(1995) (recommending "fundamental reforms" to the appellate courts); supra note 63. 
131. See supra notes 73, 124-25 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 70-89, 129 
and accompanying text (suggesting similar difficulties attending other commands in Rule 83 and 
in JIAJA). 
132. Carrington, supra note l, at 1006. 
133. See FED. R. Crv. P. 83, reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 401-02 (1993); see also Carrington, 
supra note 1, at 1006. 
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that show promise of ameliorating the situation. Evaluators should 
specifically gather greater empirical data on local rules, individual 
judicial procedures, informal practices and devolution, as well as the 
day-to-day effects of these phenomena. 
Assessors can rather easily secure much material that enhances 
understanding of the districts and judges. For example, many local 
strictures not embodied in local rules could be gleaned from computer-
ized services, a recent publication that includes the procedures 134 and 
the ninety-four districts and specific judges. CJRA experimentation also 
has generated helpful information that currently exists in many 
documents, such as annual assessments that the statute commands 
districts to assemble, or as raw data found in court records. Evaluators, 
districts and judges must preserve instructive material compiled under 
the CJRA and must employ that information to analyze the districts' 
present circumstances. 
Certain data that the CJRA requires to be formally gathered, 
examined, and synthesized is, or will soon be, available. Most important 
is the RAND Corporation's thorough study of ten pilot courts' experi-
mentation.135 The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) is also concluding its 
evaluation of five demonstration districts.136 The RAND and FJC 
reports will underlie the recommendations regarding expense and delay 
reduction that the Judicial Conference must tender to Congress by June 
30, 1997.137 The RAND and FJC studies and the raw data on which 
they are premised could be valuable sources of information on devolu-
tion, local proliferation, other problems facing the districts, and the 
efficacy of various local strictures, especially their effectiveness in 
decreasing cost and delay. 
Assessors also must scrutinize material that is not as accessible. 
Particularly significant, but somewhat elusive, are data on less formal 
activities of districts and judges. For instance, courts or judges may 
employ unwritten procedures or informally invoke local strictures while 
applying the procedures in ways that yield no written product, principal-
134. See, e.g., DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL COURT GUIDELINES (1996); see also LoCAL RULES 
PROJECT, supra note 35 (alluding to some local strictures that are not local rules). 
135. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996) [hereinafter RAND PILOT STUDY]; see also Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(c)(l). 
136. See DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION 
PROGRAMS EsTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (FJC 1997) 
[hereinafter FJC STUDY]; see also Judicial Improvements 'Act of 1990 § 104(c). 
137. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 §§ 104(c)-(d), 105(c)(2)(C); Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 608. 
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ly because attorneys and litigants are reluctant to challenge the 
judges. 138 However, evaluators should be able to collect the require-
ments from districts, judges, lawyers, or parties and can learn about their 
less formal enforcement and other informal judicial actions from these 
sources, especially counsel or litigants that have been affected. Quite 
important, and very difficult to gauge, will be the impacts of these less 
formal activities on attorneys and parties in planning litigation strategy. 
For example, assessors might seek to ascertain the number of potential 
cases which are not filed and how many lawsuits counsel and clients 
bring in alternative fora, pursue less vigorously, or settle prematurely 
due to concern about offending districts or judges in whose courts they 
will appear. 
Evaluators should determine whether districts and judges apply 
strictures, or take additional actions, that favor local lawyers and parties 
over others and benefit "repeat players" more than less frequent 
participants. Assessors also could explore whether local proliferation or 
the CJRA has encouraged forum-shopping because, for instance, the 
expense and time required to find, master and comply with new 
procedures; to file papers and attend conferences; and to conclude cases, 
increases the appeal of alternatives, such as state court or private dispute 
resolution. 
Evaluators should additionally scrutinize devolution. They might 
attempt to identify sources other than docket growth. For example, the 
CJRA's purpose of capitalizing on the ingenuity of judges, attorneys, 
and parties in the districts to discover efficacious measures for reducing 
cost and delay139 has fostered procedural inconsistency and actions 
analogous to those of the Eastern District of Texas. 140 The authoriza-
tions for local variations from the Federal Rules that were in the 1993 
federal revisions, albeit to accommodate CJRA experimentation, 
similarly facilitated devolution. 141 Numerous circuits also have found 
138. Even successful challenges of two districts' opt-out procedures for securing consent 
to assignment of civil cases to magistrate judges received unpublished dispositions. See Excel 
Indus., Inc. v. Eastern Express, Inc., No. 95-1948 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 14, 1995), appeal dismissed, 
72 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1995); Laird v. Chisholm, No. 94-35710 (D. Mont Apr. 26, 1996), appeal 
transferred, 85 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 1996). Indeed, the Montana rule remains in effect, despite the 
challenge. See MONT. R. 105-2(d). This example emphasizes the need for researchers to 
interview actual participants in litigation. The judicial officer who told me of this suggested that 
he satisfies Laird when conferences are scheduled by informing participants of their opportunity 
to consent to jurisdiction. Telephone Interview with Leif "Bart" Erickson, U.S. Magistrate Judge 
for the District of Montana (Nov. 13, 1996). 
139. See Bi den, supra note 48, at 1286; see also supra notes 36, 50-53, 81 and accompany-
ing text. 
140. See, e.g., supra note 138. But see supra notes 50, 53 and accompanying text 
141. See Stempel, supra note 54, at 58 n.2; see also supra notes 51, 95-100, 109 and 
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that district judges lacked authority to invoke procedures in ways which 
unfairly disadvantaged lawyers or litigants.142 Moreover, certain 
aspects of the proliferation and of less formal activities that seem to 
evidence devolution may actually be symptoms of the problem, rather 
than sources of it. For instance, the Montana District relies on an opt-out 
provision for securing consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction in civil 
cases. 143 This reliance reflects a good faith attempt to treat the pres-
sures created by escalating caseloads and to augment existing judicial 
capacity by exploiting a valuable available resource, more than an effort 
to deprive parties of Article III judges or to accumulate power. 144 
Once assessors have assembled the material above, they must analyze 
and synthesize it. Evaluators should clarify and refine the meaning of 
"proliferation" by ascertaining exactly how widespread the phenomenon 
is; whether it consists of conflicting, duplicative, or supplemental local 
rules, individual judicial procedures or informal practices; why courts 
apply the measures and the effects of that application. Assessors could 
specifically seek to verify Professor Carrington's assertion that much 
proliferation derives from efforts of groups of judges to solve serious 
local problems without considering the adverse systemic consequences 
of inconsistency.145 Many experts, such as CJRA Advisory Group 
Reporters, have observed this dynamic and concur in Professor 
Carrington's evaluation. 146 
Assessors might also attempt to detect district and judicial patterns 
that involve local procedures, less formal activities, and devolution. For 
accompanying text (discussing the devolution facilitated by the 1993 revisions). 
142. See, e.g., Richardson Greenshields Sec. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(stating that a court may not prevent a party from filing documents allowed by the Federal 
Rules); Williams v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 789 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(disallowing a court's use of a "directed verdict" at an improper point in a federal case). 
143. See MONT. R. 105-2(d). 
144. See MONT. R. 105-2(d); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. But see supra 
notes 111, 115 and accompanying text. Insofar as devolution reflects courts' accumulation of 
power, it may be at the expense of Congress, lawyers, or parties. 
145. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 946; Keeton, supra note 123, at 860-61; see also infra 
text accompanying notes 155, 159 (examining the relationship between local rule proliferation 
and varying local conditions). 
146. Illustrative are the experiences of Professors John Oakley, UC Davis School of Law; 
Lauren Robel, University of Indiana School of Law; and George Walker, Wake Forest 
University School of Law, who serve on multiple courts committees. Assessors must obviously 
consult many sources in more districts, perhaps by using the work of the Local Rules Project 
and the Ninth Circuit and scrutinizing districts which are diverse in terms of the judges, lawyers, 
litigants, or caseloads or of dynamics, such as advisory committee composition and duties. See 
supra note 35; Tobias, supra note 72, at 359-60; infra notes 147-48, 175-76 and accompanying 
text; see also supra note 138 (affording example suggesting need to interview those familiar with 
procedures). 
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instance, numerous judges, lawyers, and parties in some districts in the 
West practically equate magistrate judges with Article III judges for the 
purpose of resolving civil litigation,147 and the responsibilities dis-
charged by these magistrate judges apparently differ from the duties of 
their counterparts in certain courts located in relatively urbanized 
areas.148 Individual judicial procedures correspondingly seem more 
prevalent in districts that serve heavily populated locales.149 Valuable 
examples of the research that I envision are Rule 11 studies conducted 
by the FJC and the American Judicature Society (AJS), 150 evaluations 
of local strictures by the Local Rules Project which the Judicial 
Conference commissioned, similar evaluations by the Ninth Circuit 
District Local Rules Review Committee under the auspices of the 
Judicial Council, 151 and the analyses of CJRA experimentation which 
the RAND Corporation and the FJC have performed.152 
Assessors ought to investigate a few concepts that Professor 
Carrington briefly treats. One important idea is the notion of local legal 
culture. Evaluators could explore whether this precept informs compre-
hension of the devolution detected or of other phenomena that substan-
tially affect the districts. Two authors who were involved in the AJS 
Rule 11 study persuasively questioned whether the local legal culture 
idea, which researchers previously have used in the criminal law 
context, felicitously applies to civil litigation. 153 
Professor Carrington recognizes that judges' productivity, lawyers' 
civility and parties' willingness to fund litigation vary among dis-
tricts154 but "seldom suggest reasons for material differences in the 
procedures employed in different districts," while local disparities reflect 
"differences in the styles and values of particular groups of judges," not 
147. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
148. This is based on discussions with many who are familiar with the phenomenon. 
149. This is based on discussions with many who are familiar with the phenomenon and 
with procedural review. Early experience with Rule 11 's 1983 revision similarly revealed that 
participants in civil litigation in urban districts were much more willing to invoke the provision, 
perhaps because lawyers, litigants and judges in these locales interacted less frequently. See 
Georgene Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988); see also THOMAS 
E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988). 
150. See WILLGING, supra note 149; Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of 
Rule 11, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 943, 976-79 (1992) (examining statistically the frequency of Rule 
11 action in districts of various sizes). 
151. See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 35; Tobias, supra note 72, at 359. 
152. See RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 135; FJC STUDY, supra note 136. 
153. See Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control 
of Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 535 (1993); see also Marshall, supra note 150, at 976-79 
(examining empirical data about regional litigation characteristics). 
154. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 945. 
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varying local conditions. 155 In contrast, Professor Lauren Robel finds 
local conditions the best justification for discrepancies, cautioning that 
the "stuff of docket management" animates local revision.156 She also 
states that a "defensible reason for local rulemaking lies in the persis-
tence of local legal cultural norms governing such practices as the speed 
with which a case proceeds to trial or how aggressively discovery is 
conducted"157 but has difficulty arguing that the "needs of litigants and 
attorneys within an individual case vary substantially" among dis-
tricts.158 She further asserts that the "belief that the rulemakers got it 
wrong [inspires] local court tinkering with the Federal Rules."159 In 
short, the local legal culture notion and its applicability to civil litigation 
are not clearly understood, although the concept appears sufficiently 
promising to deserve additional exploration. 
Another idea, which has received little investigation but which 
warrants more, is the effect of the federal procedural developments on 
state civil procedure because many jurisdictions model their strictures 
or revision processes on the federal analogues. 160 Phenomena, such as 
devolution, which have been manifested at the federal level may be 
reflected in numerous states. For example, some Montana state district 
courts condition the right to civil trials on good faith participation in 
settlement conferences, although they have little authority for doing 
so. 161 Quite a few jurisdictions have concomitantly eschewed adoption 
of the 1993 federal amendments governing Rule 11 and automatic 
disclosure.162 In short, the federal system's somewhat chaotic condition 
may well have further fragmented state procedure in a number of 
jurisdictions.163 
155. Id. at 946 (concluding that local knowledge about housekeeping matters which vary 
across districts need not be transmitted by written commands). 
156. Robel, supra note 48, at 1483-84. 
157. Id. at 1484. 
158. Id. 
159. Id.; see also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (suggesting sponsors premised 
CJRA on preference for local experimentation). 
160. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey 
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1427 (1986) (noting the 
large number of state jurisdictions that model their rules of civil procedure on the Federal 
Rules). 
161. See Carl Tobias, Should Montana Adopt a Civil Justice Reform Act?, 53 MONT. L. 
REV. 233, 236 (1992). 
162. See, e.g .• MONT. R. CIV. P. 11, 26; W. VA. R. CIV. P. 11, 26; see also supra notes 
93-100, 104 and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Automatic Disclosure and 
Disuniformity in the Ninth Circuit, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1385, 1386 (1995) (noting the variation 
of disclosure procedures among districts). 
163. See generally Oakley & Coon, supra note 160, at 1427; Edward F. Sherman, A 
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Suggestions for collecting additional information that more directly 
involves expanding caseloads, national rule revision, and interbranch 
conflicts require limited examination here for several reasons. First, 
much greater applicable material, which thoroughly ventilates the 
relevant issues, has already been compiled, so that the phenomena are 
rather clearly understood. Second, the problems identified seem 
considerably less amenable to treatment. For example, there is a plethora 
of empirical data on docket growth and methods of responding to it, 
while numerous observers agree on the major solutions.164 
The federal amendment procedures also were extensively studied 
before the 1988 JIAJA modified them, and certain research apparently 
precipitated the changes.165 The 1993 revision process that constituted 
the initial major test of the new procedures might warrant more analysis, 
but it has already received several searching critiques, two of which 
were penned by Professor Carrington.166 The JIAJA, which opened and 
politicized the amendment process, and the current state of national 
politics make some of the problems of amendment intractable in the 
near term. 167 Moreover, the two-century history of interbranch conflict 
means that there is voluminous material on congressional and judicial 
tensions, which may be inevitable and resistant to remediation. 
Once evaluators have assembled, assessed, and synthesized applicable 
information, they probably can identify more precisely devolution's 
sources, whether that and other phenomena are troubling enough to 
require treatment and, if so, potential solutions. The completion of these 
tasks should precede attempts to afford very specific guidance regarding 
remedies. I can, however, offer general ideas by delineating possible 
sources of difficulty and by making certain assumptions. For instance, 
if expanding caseloads are reducing professionalism, assessors might 
examine many measures aimed at decreasing them, namely shrinking 
Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Refonn in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553 
(1994). 
164. One is to limit the caseloads by narrowing jurisdiction, an approach which Congress 
seems loath to implement. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Dragich, supra 
note 63, at 16. The other is to treat the increasing suits with many measures that have received 
exhaustive evaluation. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 10, at 187-97; sources cited supra note 45; 
see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (suggesting congressional reluctance to 
appropriate resources for courts to resolve cases). 
165. See, e.g., WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILmES 
(1981); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977). 
166. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 51; Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial 
Rulemaking, 15 JUDICATURE 161 (1991) (discussing the state of the rulemaking process); see 
also Mullenix, supra note 106; Laurens Walk!!r, A Comprehensive Refonn for Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993) (suggesting a method of rulemaking reform). 
167. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction, or aimed at treating docket growth, such as increasing 
resources.168 Were local proliferation causing expense and delay, 
evaluators could analyze more effective means of limiting it or could 
consult ideas in the new CJRA studies.169 If the federal amendment 
process is proving problematic, assessors might consider recommenda-
tions for improvement in the Judicial Conference Long Range Plan or 
in the Standing Committee's recent study of rulemaking.170 Evaluators 
should scrutinize the benefits and disadvantages of a broad spectrum of 
promising measures for addressing the districts' most pressing problems. 
They will thereby enable Congress and the judiciary to select felicitous 
approaches. 
B. Improving Existing Conditions 
It would be preferable to gather, analyze, and synthesize the above 
information before proffering suggestions. However, by assuming that 
the phenomena identified are sufficiently problematic to require 
treatment, I can afford numerous recommendations that address the 
observed devolution and other major complications that districts are 
encountering. Moreover, my ideas can be recalibrated as additional 
material becomes available. 
1. Local Procedural Proliferation and 
National Civil Rule Revision 
Perhaps most importantly, several entities must undertake a number 
of actions that would revitalize and thoroughly implement the initiatives 
instituted by the Judicial Conference and Congress primarily in the 
1980s and focused on limiting local proliferation and restoring the 
preeminence of the national rule revision process. 171 Congress should 
first allow the CJRA to sunset in 1997 and should clearly state that 
districts and judges are to abolish local procedures that were adopted 
168. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (limiting jurisdiction); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
110 Stat 1321 (same); see also supra notes 57, 164 and accompanying text (discussing docket 
growth). 
169. See supra notes 135-37; infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text 
170. See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 117, at 58-59; A Self-Study of Federal Judicial 
Rulemaking-A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on 
Rules of Practice, Procedure, and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679 (1996). 
171. See supra notes 33-35, 70-80 and accompanying text; see also Carrington, supra note 
l, at 1006 (making similar suggestions). I treat proliferation and the national revision process 
first because they are more important to the issues in this response. 
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and applied under the statute. 172 The courts and judges in turn must 
abrogate those strictures. 
Circuit judicial councils, districts, and judges should then effectuate 
the 1988 JIAJA, Rule 83's 1985 and 1995 amendments, and the Confer-
ence efforts to implement the findings of the Local Rules Project.173 
For example, districts and judges should promptly comply with the 1985 
revision's mandate that standing orders not contravene the Federal Rules 
or federal district rules and should satisfy the advisory committee note's 
request that districts adopt processes to prescribe and oversee the 
orders. 174 Councils might consult the Ninth Circuit Council's effica-
cious discharge of its review duties under the JIAJA.175 The success 
attained by this entity in monitoring fifteen districts' procedures suggests 
that other councils might achieve similar results, especially if Congress 
allocates funds and the CJRA-which frustrated JIAJA effectua-
tion-sunsets. I recognize that this view is controversial. For instance, 
national experience indicates that the framework instituted in 1988 has 
proved rather ineffective because authority was too broadly diffused and 
because some councils lacked the will or resources to realize the 
normative vision of national uniformity which animated Congress. 176 
Assuming that councils, districts, and judges will carefully implement 
the above ideas, the national revisors must then attempt to revive the 
federal amendment process and reattain primary responsibility for 
procedural change. The opening and politicizing of national and local 
revision procedures effected by the 1988 JIAJA could complicate this 
endeavor. As Professor Mullenix has astutely admonished, if Congress 
values public participation, there cannot be too much of it.177 She 
perceptively predicted, and the 1993 amendment process showed, that 
those dissatisfied with the federal revisors' work will take their case 
directly to Congress, 178 thus bypassing or undermining the national 
amendment process. Given the apparent reluctance of Congress to 
172. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra notes 33-35, 70-80 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
175. See Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, supra note 72; 
Tobias, supra note 83; Telephone Interview with Professor Lauren Robel, University of Indiana 
School of Law (Nov. 15, 1996). To help ameliorate the condition of the courts, districts and 
judges might review and abrogate or change conflicting strictures. 
176. See Tobias, supra note 83; Telephone Interview with Professor Lauren Robel, supra 
note 175; see also infra note 195 and accompanying text (suggesting alternatives, if Congress 
eschews council review). 
177. See Mullenix, supra note 106, at 800; see also Oakley, supra note 90, at 436-37. 
178. See Mullenix, supra note 106, at 802; supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. 
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reduce public involvement, 179 this conundrum seems unsolvable and 
can only be ameliorated. 
The rule revisors, districts, judges, and Congress might institute 
certain actions that may improve the current circumstances.180 They 
could make the judicial system's needs a paramount concern and could 
exercise more restraint in the rule amendment processes. For example, 
the national revisors should propose, and Congress should acquiesce in, 
rule changes that will best serve all interests affected by federal civil 
litigation. These interests include the needs of districts, judges, lawyers, 
parties and the public for prompt, inexpensive, and fair dispute 
disposition and the congressional need in having its statutes enforced 
effectively.181 The rule revisors should solicit and seriously consider 
the maximum feasible input of relevant interests but must strenuously 
resist special pleading of particular people or groups that seek to derive 
tactical or other benefits from procedural modifications. 182 Districts 
and judges might attempt to reduce erosion of the national revision 
process effected by local proliferation. Courts and judges could refrain 
from applying inconsistent local strictures in the absence of a strong 
need to treat peculiar local conditions that the Federal Rules do not 
address or to experiment with measures that may improve dispute 
resolution. 183 
Revitalizing the national amendment procedures also will require that 
Congress defer more to this process and exercise greater restraint when 
making procedural policy than it has in recent years.184 For example, 
Congress nearly rejected Rule 26's 1993 revision covering automatic 
disclosure,185 and many judges considered the 1990 CJRA an unwar-
ranted effort to prescribe court procedures.186 Congress should avoid 
179. See Oakley, supra note 90, at 436 (stating that Congress is increasingly receptive to 
the public's input). 
180. See Stempel, supra note 141, at 98-102 (discussing participation in the rulemaking 
process). 
181. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text. See generally Patrick 
Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure J, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995) (examining the policy behind Rule 1). 
182. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Cf. supra notes 106-09, 177-78 and 
accompanying text (suggesting problems with too open a process). 
183. Cf. infra note 187 and accompanying text (suggesting Constitution and Rules Enabling 
Act recognize Congress' interest in rule revision); see also supra notes 121-23, 181 and 
accompanying text. 
184. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 1627-28 (suggesting congressional deference to 
rulemaking when appropriate). See generally Walker, supra note 166, at 476-84 (describing a 
proposal for rulemaking procedure). 
185. See Hughes, supra note 99, at 1-4; supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 48, 113 and accompanying text. 
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such action and should only modify federal rules amendments that it 
clearly deems inadvisable. Congress should defer to the national 
revisors' significant expertise, as civil rule amendment is a central, if 
not a core, responsibility of the courts, even though the Constitution and 
the Rules Enabling Act recognize Congress's interest in revision.187 
Congress also could make less procedural policy, particularly by 
including fewer strictures in statutes and by restricting jurisdictional 
grants; that congressional action has undercut the Federal Rules' 
national, uniform nature and the federal amendment process. 
In short, the rule revisors, districts, judges and Congress must 
institute measures that will enable the national amendment procedures 
to reattain predominance and to operate in a more "normal" environ-
ment, perhaps imposing moratoria on federal and local revision. 188 
Once normalcy has been reacquired, it should be possible to ascertain 
whether this process can efficaciously address devolution and other 
critical difficulties confronting the districts. 189 
2. Interbranch Cooperation 
In addition to the above propositions regarding interbranch con-
flicts, 190 members of both branches should attempt to exercise greater 
restraint, to communicate better and to cooperate more. Congress and 
the bench may cede responsibility or at least be solicitous in areas that 
clearly involve core duties of the coordinate branch. Congress could 
pass fewer procedural statutes and limit jurisdiction more. Judges might 
evince increased deference to Congress in fields, namely federal court 
jurisdiction, as to which the Constitution accords Congress much 
power. 191 
Resolution of the fate of the CJRA, which is scheduled to sunset in 
1997, affords an auspicious occasion for the districts and members of 
each branch to work together. District judges could offer insights 
derived from CJRA experimentation. The Judicial Conference will 
consult this input and the RAND and FJC studies in deciding on 
187. See U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994). 
188. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a 
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 856 (1993); Tobias, supra note 26, at 1614 (noting a 
suggested moratorium urged by CJRA Advisory Group in the Eastern District of New York); 
see also Oakley, supra note 90, at 445 (suggesting postponement of rule reform until after an 
assessment of jurisdictional problems and needs). 
189. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 1627-28 (suggesting a cooperative approach to 
improvement of rulemaking); Walker, supra note 123. 
190. See, e.g., supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text 
191. See U.S. CONST. art II. 
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changes to the Federal Rules and on recommendations to Congress. 192 
For example, CJRA measures that reduced expense or delay might be 
included in the Rules.193 Congress will rely on the Conference sugges-
tions in ascertaining whether the statute should expire. If Congress 
permits the Act to sunset, districts and judges must then eliminate all 
inconsistent CJRA procedures. 
The statute's expiration also will offer an excellent opportunity to 
assess the IlAJA's implementation and whether circuit councils have 
effectively discharged their review duties.194 If Congress concludes that 
the councils have been ineffective, it might analyze other approaches or 
perhaps place councils on notice that they must promptly improve the 
situation. The options are varied. Congress could create a new, or charge 
an existing, centralized institution in the Judicial Conference or the FJC 
with responsibility for national oversight of local procedures; for 
communicating among councils, districts, and federal amendment 
entities; and for recommending that inconsistent local strictures replace 
corresponding Federal Rules or be abrogated. 195 
3. Devolution 
In addition to the stated ideas involving the observed devolution, 196 
I can proffer more specific suggestions. To the extent that expanding 
federal court jurisdiction and concomitant caseload growth promote 
devolution, Congress could constrict, or at least refrain from enlarging, 
jurisdiction and authorize greater resources or other measures to treat the 
increasing dockets. 197 Judges might exercise restraint in applying local 
procedures or taking less formal actions that unfairly disadvantage 
attorneys and litigants or erode the Federal Rules' national, uniform 
characterwhile invoking mechanisms that efficaciously address caseload 
increases without these impacts. Insofar as devolution reflects unautho-
rized or other inappropriate activity, judges must cease this behavior. If 
they persist, Congress could statutorily proscribe improper conduct, 
while counsel and litigants should challenge the judges' actions and 
appeals courts must reverse them. 
192. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra note 53; see also supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 70, 82-88, 175-76 and accompanying text. 
195. I am indebted to Lauren Robel for these ideas. 
196. See, e.g., supra notes 57-63, 139-44 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 57, 164, 168 and accompanying text. 
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4. A Final Word to District Judges 
The optimistic tone of my suggestions may expose them to the same 
criticism that I lodged at Professor Carrington's prescriptions. However, 
most district judges believe that the Judicial Conference and its rule 
revision entities are solicitous of their needs and that Congress is not the 
courts' enemy. In the final analysis, the judges must conclude that it is 
in their best interest and in the best interest of the judicial system for 
judges to exercise self-restraint in halting or at least ameliorating the 
devolution and other difficulties that are perceived. Should the judges 
institute these actions, they will vitiate the need for, or simply render 
irrelevant, external regulatory controls. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Disunionism is a valuable critique of much that is wrong with the 
federal districts. My response attempts to elaborate Professor 
Carrington's account by exploring additional sources of devolution and 
other problems facing the courts. If the districts, judges, and Congress 
heed his admonitions while gathering information and implementing 
measures which I suggest, they should be able to improve the condition 
of the districts as the courts enter the twenty-first century. 
